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Abstract
We study a method for proportional representation that was pro-
posed at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth century by
Gustav Enestro¨m and Edvard Phragme´n. Like Phragme´n’s better-
known iterative minimax method, it is assumed that the voters express
themselves by means of approval voting. In contrast to the iterative
minimax method, however, here one starts by fixing a quota, i. e. the
number of votes that give the right to a seat. As a matter of fact,
the method of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n can be seen as an extension
of the method of largest remainders from closed lists to open lists, or
also as an adaptation of the single transferable vote to approval rather
than preferential voting. The properties of this method are studied
and compared with those of other methods of the same kind.ar
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Introduction
Recenly, attention has been drawn to methods of proportional representation
where the electors express themselves by means of approval voting. i. e. each
elector indicates an unordered list of the candidates that he approves of to
represent him. This has lead to a renewed interest in several methods of this
kind that had been devised at the end of the 19th century. See, for instance,
Janson (2016, 2018), Brill, Laslier, Skowron (2018) and the references therein.
This note looks at a method of this kind that is associated with the names
of Gustaf Enestro¨m and Edvard Phragme´n. As in other better-known works
of Phragme´n (1894, 1895, 1896, 1899), it is assumed that the electors express
themselves by means of approval voting. However, the procedure differs from
that of those other works in that here one starts by fixing a quota, i. e. the
number of votes that give the right to a seat.
More specifically, this method can be seen as an extension of the method
of largest remainders from party lists to (unordered) open lists. On the other
hand, it can also be seen as an adaptation of the single transferable vote to
approval voting instead of preferential voting.
This method was clearly formulated by Enestro¨m in 1896. After that,
Gustav Cassel described the same procedure in 1903 under the name of
“Phragme´n’s first method”. In fact, the main principle of the procedure
can be found in a report of a lecture that Phragme´n had given in 1893
(although the final proposal of that lecture was based on preferential voting).
In the subsequent years, Phragme´n concentrated on a different idea, without
any comment on Enestro¨m’s (1896) work (which he surely knew about; see
the newspaper letters Enestro¨m 1896a and Phragme´n 1896a, published to-
gether on the same day). Later on, however, he detailed several variations of
an approval-voting procedure based on that principle. This was done in three
narrowly-circulated memoirs from 1906 (Phragme´n 1906a, 1906b, 1906c).
These memoirs were motivated by a request from Finland, where a par-
liamentary reform was on its way. That request had been addressed to Go¨sta
Mittag-Leffler and his colleague mathematicians at Stockholm, who were also
motivated by the case of Sweden itself (Stubhaug, 2010, p. 512–513). Nei-
ther Finland nor Sweden adopted Phragme´n’s proposal. In fact, Finland
adopted a procedure based upon preferential voting and the so-called har-
monic Borda method (which name we take from Janson 2018). And three
years later Sweden adopted D’Hondt’s rule together with some supplemen-
tary rules for determining which particular candidates are picked from every
party, one of these rules being the so-called Thiele’s addition method (Thiele,
1895). More historical details can be found in Janson (2016).
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As we shall see, the method of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n —more specif-
ically, the particular variation that will be singled out below— enjoys cer-
tain proportionality properties which are not fulfilled by the harmonic Borda
method nor by Thiele’s addition one. On the other hand, the compari-
son with Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method —that of 1894–99, called
“Phragme´n’s second method” by Cassel (1903)— is more closely contested,
with some advantage in favour of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n in what respects
simplicity.
Besides individual candidates, we will also allow for a candidate to consist
of several individuals. This is appropriate to deal with the hypothetical but
meaningful case where the options that are submitted to approval voting are
disjoint party lists rather than individual candidates (similarly to Hill 2011,
who advocates for preferential voting in terms of parties). In this case, the
method is expected to answer the question of how many seats should be
allocated to each party.
1 The procedure
1.1 Generalities
The Enestro¨m-Phragme´n procedure distributes a given number of seats
among several candidates which have been subject to approval voting by
a set of electors. It has an iterative character. At each step a seat is allo-
cated to the candidate with the largest number of votes and the used votes
lose a fraction of their value in accordance with a previously fixed quota.
We will use the following notation:
n number of seats to be distributed
I set of eligible candidates
i a candidate
mi capacity of candidate i, i. e. number of seats that it can fill
(= 1 for individual candidates; =∞ for parties)
k a ‘type’ of votes (or electors)
Ak set of candidates approved by the electors k (we assume Ak 6= ∅)
k
√
i another way to say that i ∈ Ak
v total number of votes
vk number of votes of type k (
∑
k vk = v )
wi number of votes that approve i : wi=
∑
k
√
i vk
ni number of seats allocated to candidate i (ni ≤ mi )
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J a subset of candidates
mJ capacity of the set J : mJ =
∑
i∈J mi
vJ number of votes that approve exactly the set J : vJ =
∑
k,Ak=J
vk
yJ number of votes that approve all candidates from J : yJ =
∑
k,Ak⊇J vk
obviously, vJ ≤ yJ
nJ total number of seats allocated to members of J : nJ =
∑
i∈J ni
q quota, i. e. number of votes that give the right to a seat
r when a seat is allocated, the used votes lose 1/r of their value
s ordinal number in the seat-allocation iterative procedure
X[s] value of X after allocating the s-th seat (X = v, vk, wi, ni, I, . . . )
I[s] set candidates that are still eligible after allocating the s-th seat,
i. e. such that ni[s] < mi
1.2 Basic version
In the works of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n one finds several variations in differ-
ent respects. In order to ensure better properties he have been led to choose
the particular combination that is described next (which is not exactly any
of the versions considered by those authors).
To start with, one adopts the (unrounded) quota of Droop and Hagenbach-
Bischoff (Pukelsheim, 2017):
q = v / (n+ 1) (1)
The n seats are allocated by means of an iterative procedure. In the
following, s is a counter that will increase from 0 to n. We start with s = 0,
vk[0] = vk (the number of votes of each type k ), ni[0] = 0 (no seats have
been allocated) and I[0] = I (all candidates are eligible).
For each s and every i ∈ I[s] (the eligible candidates) one considers the
presently existing votes in support of candidate i :
wi[s] =
∑
k
√
i
vk[s]. (2)
Seat s+ 1 is allocated to a candidate i∗ ∈ I[s] with a maximum support,
i. e. such that
wi∗ [s] = max
i∈I[s]
wi[s] =: w∗[s] (3)
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(if several maximizers exist, any of them is allowed). So
ni∗ [s+ 1] = ni∗ [s] + 1, (4)
and this candidate ceases to be eligible if its capacity has been reached:
I[s+ 1] = I[s] \ {i∗}, si ni∗ [s+ 1] = mi∗ (5)
The allocation of seat s + 1 to candidate i∗ is done at the expense of
a certain fraction of the w∗[s] votes that supported i∗. More specifically,
the votes in support of i∗ are considered to lose value in accordance with a
common factor:
vk[s+ 1] =
(
1− q
w∗[s]
)
vk[s], for k
√
i∗ and w∗[s] ≥ q, (6)
vk[s+ 1] = 0, for k
√
i∗ and w∗[s] < q, (7)
vk[s+ 1] = vk[s], for k 6√ i∗. (8)
As one can easily check, in the case w∗[s] ≥ q the following equalities
hold:
wi∗ [s+ 1] = wi∗ [s]− q, (9)
v[s+ 1] = v[s]− q. (10)
That is, the seat s+1 has been allocated at the expense of exactly one quota.
In the case w∗[s] < q the seat is allocated at the expense of all the existing
votes in support of i∗ , even though they do not complete a whole quota. So
in this case one has
wi∗ [s+ 1] = 0, (11)
v[s+ 1] > v[s]− q. (12)
If s+ 1 = n, we are finished. Otherwise, the procedure is repeated with
s replaced by s+ 1.
Remark 1.1. We are assuming that the set of candidates i such that wi > 0
contains at least n elements.
Remark 1.2. From (6)–(8) it is clear that vk[s], wi[s], and w∗[s] are non-
increasing functions of s.
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Example 1.1. Consider the election of 3 representatives out of 9 candidates
a, b, e, f, u, v, x, y, z with the following approval votes:
s = 0 : 21 a b x, 20 a b e f, 19 e f u v, 13 u v, 10 x y, 15 z, 2 a e u.
The total number of votes is v = 100. Therefore, the quota is q = v/(n+1) =
100/4 = 25. From the preceding votes, the approval support wi for each
candidate i is found to be as follows:
s = 0 : a 43, b 41, e 41, f 39, u 34, v 32, x 31, y 10, z 15.
The highest value is that of candidate a, which therefore becomes elected.
In accordance with (6), the votes that contain a get their value reduced by
the factor (1− 25/43) = 0.419. This results in the following figures:
s = 1 : 8.791 a b x, 8.372 a b e f, 19 e f u v, 13 u v, 10 x y, 15 z, 0.837 a e u.
The corresponding approval supports are now as follows, where we use paren-
theses to indicate those candidates that have already been elected and there-
fore are not eligible any more:
s = 1 : (a 18), b 17.163, e 28.209, f 27.372, u 32.837, v 32, x 18.791, y 10, z 15.
So the second elected candidate is u . The votes that contain this candidate
are now reduced by the factor (1− 25/32.837) = 0.239:
s = 2 : 8.791 a b x, 8.372 a b e f, 4.535 e f u v, 3.103 u v, 10 x y, 15 z, 0.200 a e u,
which results in the following approval supports:
s = 2 : (a 17.363), b 17.163, e 13.107, f 12.907, (u 7.837), v 7.637, x 18.791, y 10, z 15.
So x is elected in third place, in spite of having less than a quota. The three
elected candidates are thus a, u and x.
1.3 Variations
1.3.1 Simple fractions. In Phragme´n (1906a, 1906b, 1906c) equations
(6)–(7) are replaced by the following one:
vk[s+ 1] =
(
1− 1dw∗[s] / qe
)
vk[s], for k
√
i∗. (13)
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Notice that this equation agrees with (6)–(7) in the case w∗[s] ≤ q. However,
for non-integer w∗[s]/q > 1 the seat is allocated in exchange of less than a
whole quota; in other words, the equality signs of (9) and (10) are replaced by
“≥”. The rational factor in (13) was probably intended towards facilitating
the computation by hand. Another possible motivation was the comparison
with Thiele’s addition method (see §5.2.1).
1.3.2 Other quotas. The initial versions of this method (Enestro¨m 1896,
Cassel 1903, p. 47–50, Phragme´n 1906a, 1906b) made use of the simple
(a. k. a. Hare) quota q = v / n. With this quota, the above procedure is
an extension of the standard method of largest remainders. According to
Mittag-Leffler (1906), the quota of Droop and Hagenbach-Bischoff achieves
better results in comparison with Thiele’s method (related to the bad thresh-
old of the latter, see Janson 2018). Quite remarkably, the quota of Droop
and Hagenbach-Bischoff had been used already by Phragme´n (1893) in com-
putations equivalent to (6)–(8).
1.3.3 Quota updated at each step. In Phragme´n (1906a) a formula
like (13) was used but instead of the original (Hare) quota q = v[0]/n an
updated one was used, namely q′[s] = v[s]/(n− s).
1.3.4 Votes cease to count when they become empty (this vari-
ation makes sense only together with the preceding one). In this variant,
equation (6) is used only when the votes of type k contain further eligible
candidates, i. e. when Ak ∩ I[s+ 1] 6= ∅; otherwise one puts vk[s+ 1] = 0.
1.3.5 Threshold condition. If w∗[s] is much smaller than q (which case
can easily arise for a large number of candidates) then i∗ gets a seat in spite of
having much less than a quota. In this connection Phragme´n (1906b, 1906c)
proposed to require a condition of the form w∗[s]/q ≥ α for some previously
fixed α ∈ [0, 1]; if this condition is not satisfied, then the procedure would be
stopped and a new election would be called. More specifically he suggested
α = 3/4 (1906b, 1906c) and in (1906a) he had taken α = 1/2 . In our basic
version we did not include such a condition, which amounts to α = 0 (and
corresponds to the usual formulation of the method of largest remainders).
1.3.6 Negative numbers of votes. This variant would apply (6) no
matter whether w∗[s] is larger or smaller than q. As we have already seen,
this could result in negative values of vk[s+ 1] for k
√
i∗ (and consequently
negative values of wi∗ [s + 1]). However, this could still be meaningful (to
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allow) for the underlying overrepresentation to be corrected in subsequent
steps.
1.3.7 Providing for substitutes. In his memoirs Phragme´n (1906a,
1906b, 1906c) pays attention also to the problem of deciding which addi-
tional candidates are suitable to replace the elected ones. Here we will not
go into this problem.
1.4 Uninominal voting
The following propositions specify the behaviour of the Enestro¨m-Phragme´n
method in the case of uninominal voting, i. e. when every elector approves
one candidate and only one. The first proposition, whose proof is obvious, is
about the case of individual candidates. The second one is about the case of
disjoint party lists.
Proposition 1. Assume that all candidates have capacity one and that ev-
ery elector approves one of them and only one. In this case the Enestro¨m-
Phragme´n method amounts to selecting the n most voted candidates.
In the case of individual candidates, the uninominal situation is certainly
quite undesirable in the spirit of proportional representation. Nonetheless,
in such a situation there is no better way than selecting the most voted
candidates. Hopefully, in practice electors will be lead to approve more than
one candidate. Those with a minoritary opinion will do it so as to provide
more likely alternative candidates. Those with a majoritary opinion will do
it so as to obtain more representatives.
In the case of disjoint party lists the uninominal situation still allows for
a result in the spirit of proportional representation:
Proposition 2. Assume that all candidates have unlimited capacity and
that every elector approves one of them and only one. In this case the En-
estro¨m-Phragme´n method amounts to the method of largest remainders with
the Droop quota.
Proof. In the present situation each type k corresponds to a single candi-
date i and viceversa. So we can write vi instead of vk or wi . We will
distinguish two cases.
Case (a): w∗[n] < q. Let us consider the number
t = min {s | w∗[s] < q}, (14)
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and let ti mean the number of seats that are allocated to i in the first t steps
of the procedure, i. e. for s = 0 . . . t−1. The hypothesis that defines this case
ensures that t ≤ n. By the definition of t, for s < t every seat allocation is
done at the expense of exactly one quota. Therefore vi[t] = vi[0] − ti q, or
equivalently,
vi[0] = ti q + vi[t], where 0 ≤ vi[t] < q. (15)
Here, the strict inequality at the right holds because vi[t] ≤ w∗[t] < q. So,
vi[t] is the remainder of dividing the number of votes vi[0] by the quota q.
If t = n, there are no more seats to allocate and ni = ti. It t < n, then
t ≤ s < n every seat ia allocated in exchange of the whole remainder of votes
vi[t] (which can happen only once for each candidate). So these n− t seats
will be allocated to the n− t candidates with greatest remainders vi[t].
Case (b): w∗[n] ≥ q. In this case we can write
q ≤ w∗[n] ≤ v[n] = v[0]− nq = q,
where we have used the facts that w∗[n] = maxi vi[n] and v[n] =
∑
i vi[n].
So, all the terms that we have just displayed are equal to each other. In
particular, w∗[n] = q = v[n]. Now, this implies the existence of some can-
didate j such that vj[n] = q whereas vi[n] = 0 for i 6= j. So j is getting
one seat less than the number of quotas contained in vj[0]. However, any
other allocation is also allowed where this deficit of one seat is transferred to
another candidate with a positive number of votes, just in the same way as
largest remainders (with the Droop quota).
2 Proportionality properties
According to Phragme´n (1906b), “for the mathematically trained reader the
proportional character of the proposed rule for voting power reduction should
be clear without further explanation”. In this section we establish a couple
of proportionality properties of the kind that is associated with the so-called
“exclusion thresholds” (Janson 2018).
Let us recall that, for any given set J of candidates, vJ and yJ mean
respectively the number of votes that approve exactly the set J and the
number of those that approve at least the set J. In this connection, we will
use also the following notation:
J∗ =
⋃
{Ak | k such that Ak ⊇ J}. (16)
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So i ∈ J∗ if and only if i is approved by at least one voter who approves
(also) all the elements of J.
Theorem 2.1. For any subset J of candidates and any ` ≤ min(n,mJ),
if vJ > ` q then nJ ≥ `.
Theorem 2.2. For any subset J of candidates and any ` ≤ min(n,mJ),
if yJ > ` q then nJ∗ ≥ `.
Preparation for the proofs. Instead of the number (14), here we will consider
the slightly different number
p = min {s | w∗[s] ≤ q}. (17)
We claim that p ≤ n, i. e. w∗[s] ≤ q for some s ≤ n . In particular, w∗[n] ≤ q,
that is, after the allocation of the last seat, no candidate has more than a
quota. In fact, if one has w∗[s] > q for all s ≤ n − 1 then —by (10)—
v[n] = v − nq = q and therefore w∗[n] = wi[n] ≤ v[n] = q.
For any subset J of candidates we will consider the number pJ of candidates
of J that are elected in the first p steps of the procedure, i. e. for s =
0 . . . p − 1. Obviously, pJ ≤ nJ . So in order to prove Theorems 2.1 and 2.2
it will suffice to prove respectively the inequalities pJ ≥ ` and pJ∗ ≥ ` .
In the following proofs consideration is limited to s = 0 . . . p − 1, for which
we are ensured that w∗[s] > q. The candidate that is chosen in step s will
be denoted i∗[s].
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Since vJ =
∑
Ak=J
vk, when i∗[s] ∈ J, equation (6)
entails that
vJ [s+ 1] =
(
1− q
w∗[s]
)
vJ [s] ≥ vJ [s]− q,
where we used also the fact that w∗[s] = wi∗[s][s] ≥ vJ [s]. On the other hand,
when i∗[s] 6∈ J, equation (8) entails that vJ [s+ 1] = vJ [s]. Altogether we
get the inequality
vJ [p] ≥ vJ − pJ q.
Assume now that the hypothesis vJ > ` q holds, as well as the negation of the
conclusion, namely pJ ≤ `− 1. Since we are assuming ` ≤ mJ , there exists
j ∈ J that remains eligible after step p. This allows to write the following
chain of inequalities, which contradicts the definition of p :
w∗[p] ≥ wj[p] ≥ vJ [p] ≥ vJ − pJ q ≥ vJ − (`− 1) q > q.
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Proof of Theorem 2.2. Here we are considering yJ =
∑
Ak⊇J vk and the set
J∗ =
⋃
Ak⊇J Ak. An element of J
∗ need not be contained in all of these sets
Ak . However, when i∗[s] ∈ J∗ equations (6) and (8) still allow us to derive
the inequality
yJ [s+ 1] =
∑
Ak⊇J
k
√
i∗
vk[s+ 1] +
∑
Ak⊇J
k 6√ i∗
vk[s+ 1]
=
(
1− q
w∗[s]
) ∑
Ak⊇J
k
√
i∗
vk[s] +
∑
Ak⊇J
k 6√ i∗
vk[s] ≥ yJ [s]− q, (18)
where we used the fact that w∗[s] = wi∗ [s] ≥
∑
k
√
i∗, Ak⊇J vk[s]. On the other
hand, when i∗[s] 6∈ J∗, equation (8) ensures that yJ [s+1] = yJ [s]. Therefore,
we have
yJ [p] ≥ yJ − pJ∗ q.
Analogously to the proof of Theorem 2.1, this inequality together with the
hypothesis vJ > ` q and the negation of the conclusion, namely pJ∗ ≤ `− 1,
contradicts the definition of p because of the following chain of inequalities,
where j stands for any element of J that remains eligible after step p (such
an element exists because of the hypothesis that ` ≤ mJ ):
w∗[p] ≥ wj[p] ≥ yJ [p] ≥ yJ − pJ∗ q ≥ yJ − (`− 1) q > q.
Remark 2.1. By using (14) instead of (17) one can deal similarly with the
weaker hypothesis vJ ≥ ` q, resp. yJ ≥ ` q, with the result that the inequality
nJ ≥ `, resp. nJ∗ ≥ `, can fail only in certain singular cases with ties that
allow for several different allocations. Even then, some of these allocations
do satisfy the equality nJ = `, resp. nJ∗ = `.
Corollary 1 (Majority preservation). If n is odd [ resp. even ], mJ ≥ (n +
1)/2 [ resp. mJ ≥ n/2 ] and vJ > v/2 [ resp. vJ ≥ v/2 ], then nJ > n/2
[ resp. nJ ≥ n/2 ]. Analogously happens with yJ and nJ∗ instead of vJ and
nJ .
Proof. It suffices to note that the hypothesis vJ > v/2 [ resp. vJ ≥ v/2 ]
implies vJ > ` q with ` = (n+ 1)/2 > n/2 [ resp. ` = n/2 ].
Remark 2.2. This property is not satisfied when the Hare quota is used
instead of the Droop one. At the end of the 19-th century this led sev-
eral swiss institutions to adopt the method of largest remainders with the
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quota of Droop and Hagenbach-Bischoff (see Klo¨ti 1901, p. 171, 197, 276, and
Kopfermann 1991, § 3.2).
Remark 2.3. In exchange for the property contained in the preceding corol-
lary, one cannot avoid the possibility of having vJ < v/2 but nJ > n/2.
For instance, for n = 5 the votes 56A, 34B, 30C result in the seats
3A, 1B, 1C.
In the terminology of Janson (2018), Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 ensure that
both pisame(`, n) and piPJR(`, n) are ≤ q = `/(n+1). On the other hand, taking
into account the case of two parties with respectively ` q and (n + 1 − `) q
votes, one sees that both pisame(`, n) and piPJR(`, n) are equal to the optimal
value q = `/(n+ 1).
Remark 2.4. For the Thiele’s global optimization method (see §5.2) it has
been shown that in the conditions of Theorem 2.2 one is ensured the following
additional property (Janson, 2018, Theorem 7.6): There exist some electors k
such that Ak ⊇ J and Ak contains at least ` elected candidates. This
property does not hold for Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method (Janson,
2018, Example 7.4). Neither does it hold for the method that we are studying
here, a counterexample being, for instance, the following:
21 a b c1, 21 a b c2, 22 c1 c2 c3, 1 c1 c3, 15 c3. n = 3.
The seats are allocated to c1, c2 and c3 , in this order. The above-mentioned
property is not satisfied by the set J = {a, b}, for which yJ = 42 > 2q
Remark 2.5. Theorem 2.1 does not hold for variant 1. A counterexample is
the following: 95A, 79B, 75C, 7AB, 56AC with n = 3. As one can check,
party B gets no seat in spite of the fact that it has more than a quota.
Remark 2.6. The following example, taken from (Phragme´n, 1906b, p. 14),
shows that Theorem 2.2 does not hold if the hypothesis ` ≤ mJ is replaced
by ` ≤ mJ∗ :
120 a1 a2 a3 a4 a5, 86 b1 b2 b3 b4, 24 a2 a3 a4 a5.
Let n = 7. The quota is q = 230/8 = 28.75. The seats get allocated to
a2, a3, a4, b1, a5, b2 and b3 , in this order. For J = {a2, a3, a4, a5} one has
J∗ = {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5} and yJ = 144 > 5 q. However, nJ∗ = 4 < 5.
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3 Different kinds of monotonicity,
or the lack of it
3.1 Monotonicity for individual candidates
Let us consider the case of individual candidates and a variation of the votes
whereby one candidate gets more approvals than before, the other candidates
keeping exactly the same approvals as before. In such a situation one cer-
tainly expects the following property: if that candidate was allocated a seat
before the variation, he will also be allocated a seat after it. We refer to this
property as monotonicity for individual candidates.
Theorem 3.1. Monotonicity for individual candidates holds.
Proof. In the following we use a tilde to mean what happens after the votes
have been varied. Let i be the candidate that gets additional approvals. So
w˜i > wi, whereas w˜j = wj for any j 6= i. Let us assume that for the original
votes i is elected when s takes the value t . Consider now the modified votes.
We claim that either i is elected for some s < t , or it is elected for s = t . In
other words, the assumption that i is not elected for any s ≤ t − 1 implies
that it is elected for s = t . In fact, that assumption entails the following
facts for s ≤ t , which are obtained by induction: w˜i[s] ≥ wi[s] ; w˜j[s] = wj[s]
for any j ∈ I[s]\{i} ; the elected candidates are the same as with the original
votes. This gives the desired result since w˜i[t] ≥ wi[t] ≥ wj[t] = w˜j[t] for any
j ∈ I[t] \ {i}.
Remark 3.1. In the event of ties it can happen that both the original votes
and the modified ones admit one allocation where i is elected and another one
it is not. In such a case, depending on which allocation is chosen before and
after the modification it may give the wrong feeling of a lack of monotonicity
for individual candidates.
Remark 3.2. Monotonicity for individual candidates does not hold for vari-
ant 6. An example is provided by the following votes: 5 a, 4 b, 3 c, 1 di
(i = 1..18). Consider the election of 2 representatives. The quota is q = 2.
As one can check, variant 6 results in the election of a and b. However, if the
5 a votes are replaced by 5 ab, then a and c are elected instead of a and b.
3.2 Lack of monotonicity for party lists
Let us consider now the analogous situation with party lists instead of indi-
vidual candidates. So the votes undergo a variation where one of these party
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lists gets additional approvals whereas the other party lists keep exactly the
same approvals as before. In such a situation one would expect that party
to keep at least the same number of seats. However, it is not always so:
Exemple 3.1. Consider the election of 3 representatives from 3 party lists
A, B, C, with the following approval votes:
2 A, 3 B, 5 AC, 2 BC.
As one can check, the Enestro¨m-Phragme´n procedure results in the seats
being allocated successively to A, B and A. Now, if one of the votes that
presently approve only B is changed to approve also A, the seats are hen
allocated successively to A,C and B.
The following example illustrates a related but slightly different phe-
nomenon where the additional approval happens in an elector that was pre-
viously abstaining (so the number of votes, and therefore the quota, get
changed):
Exemple 3.2. Consider again the election of 3 representatives from 3 party
lists A, B, C, the initial votes being now
5 A, 3 B, 3 AB, 8 AC, 7 BC.
As one can check, the seats are again allocated successively to A, B and A.
Let us now add one vote that approves only A. After this modification, the
seats are allocated successively to A, C and B.
These phenomena can be justified by arguing that the Enestro¨m-Phragme´n
procedure aims only at electing a good set of representatives in the spirit of
proportional representation, that is, in being well distributed among the elec-
tors. Since the votes express only approval, the issue whether an elector is
represented by one or another candidate is irrelevant as long as both of them
have the approval of that elector.
3.3 Lack of house monotonicity
On the other hand, the procedure is aimed at a particular total number
of seats, whose value determines the quota. So it is not a surprise to see
that going from n to n+ 1 seats does not always amount to simply adding
one candidate. For instance, example 1.1 with n = 3 results in electing
successively a, u and x. But the same votes with n = 4 result in electing
successively a, u, b and z.
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4 Asymptotic behaviour as n→∞ in the case
of two parties
In this section we assume that there are only two parties, A and B —
so every elector approves either A or B or both of them— and we ask
ourselves about the asymptotic behaviour of nA/n and nB/n as n→∞ and
its dependence on the number of votes of each kind, vA, vB, vAB . Since the
electors that approve both A and B are indifferent between all proportions
of seats between A and B, the ideal behaviour is to reproduce the proportion
between vA and vB, that is to have limn→∞ nA/n = vA/(vA + vB).
For Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method Mora, Oliver (2015) noticed
that this desirable behaviour is far from being satisfied; instead, the depen-
dence of limn→∞ nA/n on vA, vB, vAB exhibits a “devil’s staircase” char-
acter, which phenomenon has been mathematically dissected by Janson,
O¨berg (2017). In this section we will see that the method of Enestro¨m and
Phragme´n is better behaved.
We will make use of the following notation:
α[s] = vA[s]/v, β[s] = vB[s]/v, ζ[s] = vAB[s]/v; (19)
ρ = q/v = 1/(n+ 1). (20)
For α[0] = 0 —resp. β[0] = 0— one easily sees that all seats are given to
B —resp. A— and the case ζ[0] = 0 has been dealt with in Section x.x.
So in the following developments we will assume α[0], β[0] > 0. Concerning
ζ[0] sometimes we will deal separately with the cases ζ[0] > 0 and ζ[0] = 0.
Instead of α[s], α[s+1], α[s+2], next we will write simply α, α′, α′′ , and
similarly with β and ζ. As it is shown in next lemma, we are always in the
case w∗[s] > q and the seat allocations spend always a whole quota. More
specifically, for s ≤ n − 1 the values of (α′, β′, γ′) remain positive and they
are related to (α, β, γ) in the following way:
α′ =
(
1− ρ
α + ζ
)
α, β′ = β, ζ ′ =
(
1− ρ
α + ζ
)
ζ, if α > β;
α′ = α, β′ =
(
1− ρ
β + ζ
)
β, ζ ′ =
(
1− ρ
β + ζ
)
ζ, if α < β.
(21)
In the first of these two cases the seat at stake is allocated to A and in the
second case it is allocated to B. For α = β one is allowed to choose between
both possibilities.
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Lemma 1. Assume that ζ[0] > 0. The following facts take place:
max (α + ζ, β + ζ) > ρ ∀s ≤ n− 1, (22)
(α′, β′, γ′) are related to (α, β, γ) by (21) ∀s ≤ n− 1, (23)
α + β + ζ = 1− s ρ = (n+ 1− s) ρ, ∀s ≤ n, (24)
α, β, ζ > 0, ∀s ≤ n. (25)
Proof. For s = 0 (24) holds because of the definition of α, β, ζ , and (25)
is a standing hypothesis. Still for s = 0, (22) holds because the contrary
inequality, namely having both α + ζ ≤ ρ and β + ζ ≤ ρ would imply
α + β + ζ < α + β + 2 ζ ≤ 2ρ , i. e. (n + 1)ρ < 2ρ , i.e. n < 1. On the
oher hand, one easily checks that (22) implies (21) and that the resulting
(α′, β′, γ′) satisfy (24) (with s replaced by s+ 1) and (25).
So it only remains proving that (22) gets reproduced as long as s ≤ n−1.
Let s be the last time that (22) holds and assume that s ≤ n−2. As we have
just seen, this implies α′ + β′ + ζ ′ = (n− s)ρ and α′, β′, ζ ′ > 0. But we are
assuming that max (α′ + ζ ′, β′ + ζ ′) ≤ ρ. Without loss of generality, we can
assume also that max (α′ + ζ ′, β′ + ζ ′) = α′ + ζ ′. By combining these facts
with the known value of α′ + β′ + ζ ′, we get β′ ≥ (n − s − 1)ρ ≥ ρ, where
we have used the assumption that s ≤ n − 2. On account of the inequality
ζ ′ > 0, it follows that β′+ζ ′ > ρ, in contradiction with the above assumption
that max (α′ + ζ ′, β′ + ζ ′) ≤ ρ.
Lemma 2. Assume that ζ[0] > 0. If seat s+1 is allocated to A and seat s+2
is allocated to B, then seat s + 3 is necessarily allocated to A. Analogously
happens for A interchanged with B.
Proof. Giving the seat s+ 1 to A and seat s+ 2 to B implies
α′ = (1− ρ
α + ζ
)α, β′ = β, ζ ′ = (1− ρ
α + ζ
) ζ; (26)
α′′ = α′, β′′ = (1− ρ
β′ + ζ ′
) β′, ζ ′′ = (1− ρ
β′ + ζ ′
) ζ ′. (27)
Besides, we are ensured that α/β ≥ 1 (and α′/β′ ≤ 1). Our claim will be
proved if we show that α′′/β′′ > 1. Since
α′′
β′′
=
1
(1− ρ/(β′ + ζ ′))
α′
β′
=
(1− ρ/(α + ζ))
(1− ρ/(β′ + ζ ′))
α
β
,
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it suffices to check that
(1− ρ/(α + ζ))
(1− ρ/(β′ + ζ ′)) > 1. But this amounts to see that
β′ + ζ ′ < α + ζ,
i. e.
β + (1− ρ
α + ζ
) ζ < α + ζ.
Now, the only way that this could fail is having ζ = 0 and β = α . However,
ζ > 0 by (25).
Remark 4.1. The preceding computations show that if α/β = 1 and seat
s+ 1 is given to A , then α′/β′ = (1− ρ/(α+ ζ))α/β < 1 and seat s+ 2 is
given necessarily to B; besides, α′′/β′′ > α/β = 1 and seat s + 3 is given
necessarily to A. On the other hand, by continuing with the same oargument,
one gets α′′′/β′′′ < 1, α′′′′/β′′′′ > 1 and so on. So in the case ζ[0] > 0 a tie
of the form α/β = 1 can happen only once.
Lemma 3. Assume that ζ[0] = 0 and that seat s + 1 is the matter of a
tie, i. e. α = β . If that seat is allocated to A then seat s + 2 is allocated to
B and seat s + 3 is again the matter of a tie. Analogously happens for A
interchanged with B.
Proof. It suffices to check that α′/β′ = (1−ρ/α)α/β < 1 and that α′′/β′′ =
(α − ρ)/(β − ρ) = 1. The only problem could be having α = ρ and β = ρ,
but one can check that this can happen only for s = n − 1, and then s + 3
is not attained.
Anyway, both in the case ζ[0] > 0 and in the case ζ[0] = 0 the preceding
facts have the following consequence.
Corollary 2. There exists an integer k such that the first k seats are allo-
cated all of them to the same party and the remaining n−k seats are divided
between the two parties either equally or with an advantage of one seat to the
other party.
Obviously, nA and nB are determined from the value of k and the know-
ledge of which party has been allocated the first seat. Without loss of gen-
erality, we will assume that this party is A. Our aim is now to estimate the
value of k .
In the remainder of this section we switch back to denoting the values at
step s by α[s], β[s], ζ[s] , and the initial ones as α, β, ζ (α + β + ζ = 1).
The hypothesis that the first seat is allocated to A implies that α ≥ β .
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According to the definition contained in the preceding corollary, k is
either the first integer less than n such that α[k] ≤ β[k] or that integer
plus one (the second possibility existing only in the case of a tie). For our
purposes, it will suffice to consider the first possibility, since both of them
have the same asymptotic behaviour as n→∞ .
The value of k can be computed in the following way. To start with, from
the knowledge that the first k seats are all allocated to A it follows that
α[k] + ζ[k] = α + ζ − k ρ. (28)
On the other hand, the equality α[s+ 1]/α[s] = ζ[s+ 1]/ζ[s] being true for
s = 0, 1, . . . k − 1 implies that
α[k]
α
=
α[k] + ζ[k]
α + ζ
. (29)
From these facts, one derives that
α[k] =
(
1− k ρ
α + ζ
)
α. (30)
On the other hand, we know that β[k] = β. From these facts, the first integer
k for which α[k] ≤ β[k] is found to be
k =
⌈
(α− β)(α + ζ)
α ρ
⌉
, (31)
where dxe means the smallest integer larger than or equal to x . Since ρ =
1/(n+ 1), we get
lim
n→∞
k
n
=
(α− β)(α + ζ)
α
. (32)
Finally, it only remains to take into account that k is related to nA in
the following way: nA = k+(n−k)/2 for n−k even, nA = k+(n−k−1)/2
for n− k odd. From these facts, it follows that
lim
n→∞
nA
n
=
1
2
(
1 +
(α− β)(α + ζ)
α
)
, for α ≥ β. (33)
The above constraint α ≥ β, corresponds to the assumption that we have
made that the first seats are allocated to A . For the contrary case, the
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analogous formula for limn→∞ (nB/n) amounts to
lim
n→∞
nA
n
=
1
2
(
1− (β − α)(β + ζ)
β
)
, for α ≤ β. (34)
In particular, both formulas coincide in giving limn→∞ (nA/n) = 1/2 for α =
β. On the other hand, for ζ = 0 both of them become limn→∞ (nA/n) = α
(since α + β = 1).
Figure 1 shows the way that the limit depends on α for a fixed value of
ζ (in which case β = 1− ζ − α).
α
0
1
0 1−ζ
Figure 1: Dependence of limn→∞(nA/n) with respect to α for ζ = 0.376.
5 Comparison with other methods
In this section the above properties of the method of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n
will be compared with those of the main alternative methods for parlia-
mentary elections through approval voting. More specifically, we will con-
sider both Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method (1894, 1895, 1896, 1899);
and Thiele’s methods (1895), all of which are extensions of D’Hondt’s rule
from party lists to open lists.
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5.1 Phragme´n’s minimax method
Phragme´n’s minimax method hinges on considering how to distribute each
representative, i. e. elected candidate, among “his” electors, i. e. those who
approved him. In this connection, it aims at minimizing the inequality be-
tween electors in what respects the total amount of representation obtained
by each of them. More specifically, here Phragme´n aimed at minimizing the
maximal amount of representation obtained by an elector. In the general
case of open lists, such optimization is not easy to compute. Which is why,
instead of it, Phragme´n proposed a greedy sequential procedure where ev-
ery step looks for an additional representative that locally minimizes that
maximal representation.
This criterion of minimal inequality of representation between electors
is directly related to the notion of proportional representation. Although it
differs from the interpretation of this notion in terms of a quota, it turns out
that Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method satisfies also Theorems 2.1 and
2.2 with q = v/(n + 1). Equivalently said, it enjoys optimal values of both
pisame and piPJR (Janson 2012, Sats 13.5.(ii), Janson 2018, Section 7.2).
Concerning monotonicity, Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method behaves
like that of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n: monotonicity for individual candidates
holds (Mora, Oliver, 2015, Prop. 7.10) and monotonicity for party lists fails
(Mora, Oliver, 2015, § 7.5). House monotonicity is certainly a different matter
since Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method satisfies it by construction.
On the other hand, concerning the asymptotic behaviour in the case of two
parties, Phragme´n’s iterative minimax method exhibits a singular behaviour
where, for instance, the smooth curve of Figure 1 is replaced by a “devil’s
staircase” where every rational value is the image of an interval of positive
measure (see Mora, Oliver 2015, § 7.7, and Janson, O¨berg 2017, § 11.4).
5.2 Thiele’s methods
Thiele’s methods aim at maximizing the total amount of satisfaction of the
electors. In this connection, the satisfaction σ of an elector is postulated to
depend only on the number h of elected candidates that had been approved
by that elector; this dependence σ(h) is assumed to be non-decreasing with
σ(0) = 0 and σ(1) = 1.
More particularly, Thiele paid special attention to the case where this
dependence has the following form:
σ(h) = 1 + (1/2) + · · ·+ (1/h), with σ(0) = 0. (35)
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As one can easily see, this function has the property that in the case of party
lists the criterion of maximizing the total satisfaction leads to D’Hondt’s rule.
As in § 5.1, the computational complexity of the general case of open lists
led Thiele to replace the original optimization criterion by certain greedy
sequential versions, which are known respectively as Thiele’s addition method
and Thiele’s elimination one.
5.2.1 Thiele’s addition method. In this method one starts with the
empty set and every step looks for an additional representative that results
in a maximum increment of satisfaction.
For the sake of comparison with the method of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n,
it is worth noticing that Thiele’s addition method can also be viewed in terms
of a progressive reduction of the value of each vote each time that it is used to
elect a new candidate. In fact, it amounts to the following reduction scheme:
a ballot is reduced to 1/2 of its value when it is first used to elect one of
its candidates. When a second candidate of a ballot is elected, the value of
that ballot is reduced to 1/3 of its initial value, or equivalently, to 2/3 of its
previous value. Similarly, when a third candidate of a ballot is elected, the
value of that ballot is reduced to 1/4 of its initial value, or equivalently, to
3/4 of its previous value. And so on.
This has some similitude to the method that we have been discussing,
especially its “simple fractions” variation (§ 1.3.1). However, the reduction
factors of Thiele’s method are independent from the number of ballots that
supported the elected candidate, let alone with comparing this number to
any prefixed quota. So, that similitude is only superficial. In the words of
Phragme´n 1906a, p. 4, Thiele’s addition rule “is a purely formal generalisation
of D’Hondt’s rule, and therefore lacks genuine justification.”
In particular, proportionality properties such as Theorems 2.1 and 2.2
cease to hold when the votes deviate from the case of disjoint party lists.
Consider, for instance, the following example due to Tenow (1912):
1 a, 9 a b, 9 a c, 9 b, 9 c, 13 k l m, (36)
which will be compared with
37 a b c, 13 k l m. (37)
Assume that n = 3. The quota is q = 50/4 = 12.5. So, the hypotheses of
Theorem 2.1 are satisfied with J = {k, l,m} and ` = 1. If that theorem
were true we should have nJ ≥ 1. This holds in the case of (37), where a, b
and k are successively elected (as in D’Hondt’s rule). However in the case
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of (36), Thiele’s addition method successively elects a, b and c. By the way,
one can imagine that (37) are sincere votes and (36) is a strategy that allows
the abc party to get all three seats. In the framework of Janson (2018), the
fact that Thiele’s addition method does not comply with Theorems 2.1 and
2.2 translates into its values of pisame(`, n) and piPJR(`, n) being larger than
the optimal value `/(n+ 1) (see Janson 2018, Section 7.4).
Concerning monotonicity, Thiele’s addition method behaves exactly as
Phragme´n’s iterative minimax one: monotonicity for individual candidates
holds (Janson, 2016, Theorem 14.2), monotonicity for party lists fails, and
house monotonicity holds by construction.
Finally, concerning the asymptotic behaviour in the case of two par-
ties, Thiele’s addition method turns out to comply with the ideal behaviour
limn→∞ nA/n = α/(α + β) = α/(1 − ζ) (Janson, O¨berg, 2017, Example
12.10).
5.2.2 Thiele’s elimination method. In contrast to the above addition
procedure, here one starts with the the set of of all candidates and every step
looks for which of them should be removed in order to obtain a minimum
decrement of satisfaction.
It turns out that this procedure does satisfy Theorem 2.1 but not 2.2
(Janson, 2018, § 7.5). In the particular case of (36) it successively eliminates
m, l and a , thus resulting in the election of b, c and k (by the way this is
also the result of Thiele’s global optimization criterion). This result agrees
with Theorem 2.1, which grants one seat to the set J = {k, l,m}. However,
it is also true that this set of elected candidates does not include the most
voted one, namely a. Such a fact can be viewed as a major flaw of this
method (which view was endorsed by Phragme´n 1899, p. 301–302). Another
flaw of this procedure is that it lacks even the property of monotonicity for
individual candidates.
For completeness, we will also mention that computational experiments
about the asymptotic behaviour in the case of two parties, show Thiele’s
elimination method to comply with the ideal behaviour limn→∞ nA/n =
α/(α + β) = α/(1− ζ).
Anyway, the elimination procedure is rather inappropriate for the case
where the items that are being approved or not are parties. In fact, in this
case that procedure must begin by considering how many candidates are
included in a party list, in spite of the fact that this number should be rather
irrelevant.
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5.3 About the harmonic Borda method
The harmonic Borda method, adopted by Finland in 1907, does not lend
itself easily to be compared with the method of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n nor
the preceding ones, since all of the latter assume approval voting, whereas
the harmonic Borda method assumes preferential voting.
Having said that, the proportionality property of Theorem 2.1, namely
the fact that pisame(`, n) equals the optimal value q = `/(n + 1), can be
compared to the fact that the harmonic Borda method has a larger value of
pisame(`, n) (Janson, 2018, Section 10).
5.4 Comparison table
Table 1 below summarizes the preceding results for the methods that assume
approval voting. In column ‘Type’ we indicate the behaviour in the case
of uninominal voting in terms of party lists: ‘Dr’ means largest remainders
with the Droop quota, and ‘D’H’ means D’Hondt’s rule. Columns ‘Thm. 2.1’
and ‘Thm. 2.2’ indicate whether these theorems are satisfied or not. In the
column ‘Mono’, the value ‘ind’ means that monotonicity holds for individual
candidates but not for party lists (see Section 3) whereas ‘× ’ means that
monotonicity fails even for individual candidates. The column ‘2Lim’ refers
to the asymptotic behaviour in the case of two parties; here the value ‘
√
’
means that the limit is the ideal fraction α/(α + β), the value ‘× ’ is moti-
vated by the devil’s staircase phenomenon of Phragme´n’s iterative minimax
method, and the value ‘∼ ’ means a smooth function not very different from
the ideal one. Finally, the column ‘Simpl’ tries to categorize the simplicity
of the method in two levels: ‘∼ ’ – acceptable, and ‘× ’ – somewhat complex.
Type Thm. 2.1 Thm. 2.2 Mono 2Lim Simpl
Enestro¨m-Phragme´n Dr
√ √
ind ∼ ∼
Phragme´n, maximin D’H
√ √
ind × ×
Thiele, addition D’H × × ind
√
∼
Thiele, elimination D’H
√
× ×
√
×
Table 1: Comparison of different methods for
making a choice by approval-preferential voting.
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6 An attempt at a divisor-like variation
For disjoint closed lists, the rules of largest remainders and D’Hondt are re-
lated in the following way: D’Hondt’s rule is the result of adjusting the quota
so that exactly n seats are allocated without making use of any remainders.
In the present setting of (possibly intersecting) open lists, one can try to do
the same from the procedure of Enestro¨m and Phragme´n, namely to adjust
the quota so that exactly n seats are allocated under the conditions that ev-
ery seat is allocated in exchange of one quota and that no candidate remains
that achieves a whole quota. In our notation, and making allowance for ties,
this amounts to the quota q and the number of seats n being related in the
following way:
w∗[n− 1] ≥ q ≥ w∗[n], (38)
where w∗[s] are obtained by the algorithm of § 1, and therefore they depend
on q.
Remark 6.1. The preceding inequalities are analogous to the following ones
for D’Hondt’s rule (see Pukelsheim 2017, §4.6):
min
i
vi/ni ≥ q ≥ max
i
vi/(ni + 1). (39)
Unfortunately, such a plan is hindered by several difficulties. To begin
with, for a given n one can have different values of q that satisfy (38) but lead
to different allocations of the n seats. In order to deal with this difficulty,
one can think of further specifying q, for instance, by requiring it to be as
large as possible. However, such a condition is not easy to compute. In fact,
it might seem that it amounts to solving the equation w∗[n− 1] = q (where
the left-hand side depends on q ) but sometimes this equation has no solution
at all.
These difficulties occur, for instance, in the following example, where
A, B and C are three party lists:
7 A, 10 B, 5 AB, 17 C, 13 AC, 4 B C. (40)
Figure 2 shows the dependence of w∗[n− 1] as a function of q for n = 2...9.
As one can see, for n = 2, 3 the corresponding curves do not reach the
diagonal w∗[n− 1] = q . On the other hand, for n = 6 the corresponding
curve exhibits a discontinuity that is associated with the allocation changing
from 4C, 1A, 1B to 3C, 2A, 1B.
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Figure 2. w∗[n− 1] as a function of q for example (40)
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